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Fin. Bureau  
October 30, 1962

**MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BUNDY**

**Subject: Turkish IRBM's**

We were asked yesterday to review planning regarding Turkish IRBM's, in the light of recent developments. A paper discussing next steps is attached. It reflects discussions with EUR and NEA, as well as our own thinking.

W. W. Rostow

Attachment:

As stated.

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E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (F)

NL 75-123 State letter 6/5/75  
By: NLEJ NARS, Date 8/8/75

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October 30, 1962

MEMORANDUM

Subject: Turkish IRBM's

1. Problem: To review planning regarding Turkish IRBM's in the light of recent developments.

2. US Objectives:

(a) To set in motion actions that will lead to removal of Turkish IRBM's, so that we will not continue to be embarrassed by a deployment of obsolescent and vulnerable weapons that is not, in fact, in the US interest.

(b) To avoid clouding the appearance of US resolution conveyed by our recently demonstrated will and ability to get Soviet offensive weapons removed from Cuba without any trade-off of US and allied interests.

3. Discussions: One way of achieving these objectives would be through an arms control agreement involving reciprocal concessions, e.g., some general limitation on MRBM deployment or on offensive strategic nuclear bases. This possibility is being explored by ACDA. For purposes of the discussion that follows, however, it is assumed that this possibility is not sufficiently promising to obviate the need for now taking steps that would facilitate a unilateral Turkish decision to remove the IRBM's.

The Turks will only take such a decision in good grace if they feel that an adequate substitute is at hand. Deployment of US Polaris submarines to the Mediterranean would not constitute such a substitute, even if it were accompanied by such other steps as pre-stocking of US equipment in Turkey, rotation of US forces to Turkey, military aid to Turkey, etc - helpful though these steps would undoubtedly be.

The heart of the matter is this: The Turks now have in the Jupiters a nuclear missile system which they own,

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which they are beginning to man, and in whose control they can participate. They would take poorly to any arrangement which deprived them of that system without equivalent participation in another nuclear missile systems in return.

Their reaction to such an arrangement would suggest urbi et orbi that their security had been sacrificed by the US for its own interests; a general suspicion that this was, in fact, the case could have an unnerving effect on the alliance as a whole and eat into the prestige dividends we have so far earned in Cuba.

The only way to avoid this reaction would be to offer the Turks the alternative of either another national Turkish MRBM force or of a multilateral MRBM force, to replace the IRBM's. Of the two, the latter is clearly to be preferred; another Turkish national force would generate the same Soviet and other pressures that are now being directed against Turkish IRBM's.

4. Proposal: Ambassador Finletter has suggested a pilot NATO Southern Command multilateral sea-based force, in which the Italians, Turks, Greeks, and US (and perhaps the Canadians) might take part.

We should now consult with the countries concerned about such a force, as part of the follow-up to the US October 22 MRBM presentation to the NAC. To this end, we should now send our travelling MRBM team on the road, as we indicated on October 22 that we would, - beginning with Ottawa, Rome, Ankara, and Athens, where it could surface the concept of the small pilot southern force. While the team was thus doing business in home capitals, we would be consulting with the Embassies concerned here, and Ambassador Finletter would be consulting the appropriate PermReps in Paris.

Since the size and cost of a pilot force would be limited, the Italians - who have been doing some work on their own in regard to sea-based deployment - might see an opportunity for alliance leadership in opening up this possibility in the NAC.

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It is not inconceivable that agreement in principle could be reached by the countries concerned fairly rapidly. Both the Turks and the Italians reacted favorably to the October 22 concept; they would also see the advantages of getting on with the pilot force, as a means of gracefully phasing out land-based IRBM's, which they would expect to be the object of increasing pressures in the post-Cuban period. The Canadians have also shown themselves favorable to the multilateral concept.

The US would have to participate, and to be prepared to evidence its oft-repeated willingness to bear its fair share of multilateral MRBM cost, if the pilot force were to come into being. This force might be about the size (48 missiles - 6 ships) of the Turkish and Italian IRBM force that it would replace, instead of the 200 missiles and 25 ships that have been discussed for the total NATO force.

We could make clear that the US contribution to this pilot force would be all that the US would contribute in the way of money to any NATO multilateral force, since the other European countries which might form a larger force after EEC negotiations should be able to pay their own way. (Indeed, these countries could buy out the US and Canada, if they wanted to set up an all-European force at that time.)

In a force with the membership of the pilot force, pressures for a control formula excluding US participation would probably be minimal. US warhead custody could be maintained, as the Germans have suggested, while the problem of long-term control arrangements was being studied. This would ease our problem with the JCAE, although the problem would remain of the Committee's past concern as to whether meaningful US custody is possible aboard non-US ships.

The British ought not object to agreement now being reached on a small pilot Southern Command force, since this would not directly affect the politically sensitive issues of Germany's nuclear status or of post-EEC Franco-British

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nuclear relations. The British will, furthermore, be as anxious as anyone to see Turkish IRBM's phased out and the relation of a Southern Command force to such phasing out will not escape them.

Once agreement had been reached in principle on the Southern Force by the countries concerned, it would probably not be difficult to move the Turkish and Italian governments to indicate, in the course of NAC discussion, that they would wish to phase out IRBM's at an appropriate time, since they would not need and could not afford both to operate IRBM's and to participate in the pilot force.

These Turkish and Italian statements could then be made public, which should help to reduce pressures and agitation over Turkish IRBM's.

Once that agitation had died down, it might be possible to persuade the Turks to start taking out the IRBM's long before the Southern Force came about, in view of the prospect of that Force and the interim coverage provided by US Polaris.

In acting along these lines, the alliance would have not only met the Turkish IRBM problem in a constructive fashion; it would also have taken a concrete step toward strengthening nuclear aspects of the partnership. Such a step would be useful in meeting European concerns over the Soviet MRBM's; these concerns are likely to grow in the wake of a crisis triggered by deployment in Cuba of one tenth as many MRBM's as now threaten Europe. And such a step would establish a pattern and precedent, which would be extended after EEC negotiations, if the other NATO countries concerned were willing to pay the freight.

5. Conclusion. We should now consult with the Italians, Turks, Greeks, and Canadians about the concept of a pilot Southern Command multilateral force (i) in home capitals; (ii) with Embassies here; (iii) with PermReps in Paris. In light of this urgent consultation we can then determine when and how best to launch NAC discussion of this concept, in order to create a framework for appropriate Turkish and Italian IRBM statements.